



THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

J3M 1703 '65

4 November 1965

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RAY S. CLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Summary of Air Operations Against
the DRV (U)

1. (C) The attachment summarizes the program of air strikes against the DRV per our discussions of Monday, 1 November. I trust it will be useful in the analysis you are undertaking.

2. (C) The DIA document informally known as the "BDA Book," or "Analysis of Air Strikes Against the DRV," updated daily in collaboration with J-3, is a useful cross reference for many details. In the understanding a copy has been furnished you, many of those details are not restated in the attachment. We recognize the possibility of errors in the DIA document, but it is intended to be the most accurate summary of its kind in existence.


3. (TS) Insofar as concerns analysis of possible DRV reactions to and understanding of our program to date, I believe the following points merit inclusion in your considerations:

a. The present DRV leadership still comprises men who participated personally in putting their regime in power by methods which included armed force, military and other. It appears necessary to credit them with comprehensive and valid understandings of both the broad considerations and the professional details of the systematic application of armed force toward objectives, "political" or other.

b. They probably have reasonably accurate knowledge of the entire US military posture in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and are capable of understanding and interpreting the capabilities inherent in that posture.

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c. It is thus likely that they are capable of and have attempted valid professional appraisals of US military actions against the DRV.

d. Such analyses would probably find substantial apparent anomalies between US capabilities and professional knowledge of how to use them, on the one hand, and the seemingly hesitant and half-way measures adopted and the militarily improper manner of their executions, which could have been noted by qualified observers.

e. One explanation of such anomalies would be that the United States didn't really mean what it was saying publicly as regards its intentions in Southeast Asia. Divergencies between public pronouncement and actual intent being no novelty to the communists, this explanation should not be too difficult of acceptance by them. This could bear upon the several indications at various past times that Hanoi was not recognizing our announced determination. And in the stated view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it could contribute to the possibility of communist miscalculations which would lead them to further escalations.



L. M. MUSTIN
Vice Admiral, USN
Director for Operations

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